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Abstract 
 
We derive a golden rule for the level of life-extending health care when the utility of the old 
depends not only their level of consumption but also on the number of old people alive. 
While previous work has emphasized the negative pecuniary externality from longevity, we 
derive the effect of the positive non-pecuniary externality of being able to consume with 
other members of one’s cohort.  
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1. Introduction 
Consumption requires not only time but often good company. The experience of having a 
meal at a restaurant, going to the theatre, playing golf or taking a vacation depends on the 
company one has; being alone, with one partner or in a group of people.  Old age brings 
loneliness for many individuals lucky enough to enjoy longevity. The loss of a spouse, 
relatives and friends brings both grief as well as having fewer people to socialize with.  In 
this paper we incorporate this insight into an overlapping-generations model and show that it 
can justify spending more resources on extending lives than the individuals themselves would 
have chosen to do. 
A large literature documents the effect of loneliness on the well-being of elderly 
individuals.  Heikkinen et al. (1995) find that loneliness affects health in old age and Green et 
al. (1992) find that loneliness is correlated with depression. Singh and Misra (2009) used 
questioners for a sample of 55 elderly people in the age group of 60-80 years and find a 
significant positive correlation between loneliness and depression for both men and women.1  
The decision on how to allocate resources between the generally healthy working-age 
population and expending them on health care for the old is one of the most important taken 
by society. In a previous paper (Gestsson and Zoega, 2018) we extended the work of Hall and 
Jones (2007) by deriving the socially optimal level of life-extending health care where the 
marginal benefit in terms of the utility yielded by each additional year of life was set equal to 
the marginal cost of such health care that consisted of lower consumption of the working-age 
population. Our analysis showed that in a private market individuals overinvest in life-
extending health care by ignoring the pecuniary negative effect their own longevity has on 
the income of other retirees by lowering the rate of return on annuities.2 The question 
                                                          
1 The used the UCLA loneliness scale, see Russell et al. (1980) and the Beck depression inventory, see Beck et 
al. (1961).  
2 See Blanchard (1985) and Heijdra et al. (2011) 
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concerning the optimal level of health care spending is closely related to the golden rule 
literature that started with Ramsey (1928) on the optimal level of saving and was extended to 
the optimal level of research and the optimal level of education (see Phelps, 1966 and 1968, 
among others). Here, investing in future research ideas, education, or the physical capital 
stock requires a reduction in current levels of consumption, while more capital, better 
technology and better education will increase future consumption. When it comes to life 
extension the question is how much consumption each generation of working-age should 
sacrifice in order to invest in longevity, which brings more years spent in retirement, hence 
more retirement consumption.  
There is also a literature on the optimal size of the population in philosophy using the 
utilitarian approach where the optimal size of the population can be determined as the one 
maximizing total utility –  the product of the number of people alive and their personal utility 
levels. This raises philosophical dilemmas discussed extensively in the literature because an 
increase in the number of people alive that is accompanied by lower consumption and utility 
of each of them may increase societal utility by making each person worse off. This gives rise 
to Parfit’s (1984) Repugnant Conclusion, according to which a large increase in the number 
of people alive can increase total utility even though each person’s life is barely worth living. 
Here population size substitutes for average utility and it is the quality-quantity substitution 
that is repugnant. A related problem is Methuelah’s Paradox, see Cowen (1989). Here a 
longer life welfare dominates a shorter life even though the level of consumption in each year 
is lower. Thus a very long life during which the individual finds his life almost not worth 
living is preferred to a shorter live of higher utility per year. We will get around these 
paradoxes by assuming diminishing marginal utility and diminishing marginal productivity of 
health care spending. 
4 
 
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2015) show how efficiency considerations can justify public 
investment in health. First, assuming exogenous mortality risk, they show how publicly-
funded health spending on the young can improve welfare if the real rate of interest higher 
than the rate of population growth. The reason is that the social opportunity costs of public 
investment in the health care of the young equals the rate of the population growth while the 
private costs equals the rate of interest.3 Second, they show that the young may also 
underinvest in health when mortality risk is endogenous in the presence of mortality-
contingent claims. Here public provision of health care lowers the interest rate on life 
annuities because of reduced mortality risk, which helps the young if they are net-borrowers.  
In this paper we add an important element missing from this literature that may offset the 
negative pecuniary effect of longevity, which is the utility gained in old age from having 
more old people around to enjoy consumption with. In essence, we make the utility of 
consumption in old age depend on the company of others. Thus eating in a restaurant is 
(usually!) more enjoyable in the company of other people and the same applies to many other 
activities such as playing golf or travelling. The inclusion of this element into our social 
planner's problem has the added effect of possibly reversing the result that individuals tend to 
overinvest in health care. We formulate our analysis in a simple model used in our earlier 
paper as (Gestsson and Zoega, 2018) well as the Hall and Jones (2007) one. 
 
2. A simple model 
Imagine a social planner who decides on the optimal steady state in terms of the number of 
old people alive, consumption per young individual, consumption per old individual and life-
extending medical expenditures. He faces a trade-off between having more consumption 
while young and shorter lives, on the one hand, and having lower consumption and longer 
                                                          
3 This result mirrors the standard result that a pay-as-you-go pension system is welfare reducing in a 
dynamically efficient economy. 
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lives, on the other hand. We then compare his decision to that of a private individual making 
a decision on the resources allocated to health care with only his own interests in mind. 
Now denote the age of death by A, the age of retirement by R, consumption during 
working age by 𝑐𝑤, consumption during retirement by 𝑐𝑜 and the flow of medial expenditures 
per old individual by τ. We assume that utility when young is 𝑢(𝑐𝑤), where 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) > 0 and 
𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤) < 0, while utility when old depends on the number of people alive; 
𝑣(𝑐𝑜 ,𝐴 − 𝑅)                                                                           (1) 
where v1>0, v11<0, v2>0, v22<0 and v12>0. The rationale for the inclusion of A-R in the utility 
function is that the older generation enjoys both the company of others and also values 
consumption more when in company with other retirees. Examples include going to 
restaurants with friends, playing golf and vacation time. Clearly, all of those activities would 
be less enjoyable when consumed in solitude. The younger generation is less concerned about 
having company since the number of working-age individuals can be taken for granted 
because everyone, by assumption, reaches retirement age. The total utility of those currently 
alive can be written as 
 𝑅𝑢(𝑐𝑤) + (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣(𝑐𝑜,𝐴 − 𝑅)                                         (2) 
Utility depends on consumption when young and old and also on the number of old 
individuals. The social planner can affect longevity, hence also the number of old people 
alive at each point in time, by spending more on health care τ. The relationship between 
longevity and health care expenditures are given by 
 𝐴 = γ𝐵(𝜏)                                                             (3) 
where 𝐵′(𝜏) > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐵′′(𝜏) < 0 and γ>0 is a measure of productivity in health care 
provision. The resource constraint facing the social planner is the following; 
 𝑅(𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤) = (𝐴 − 𝑅)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏)                                              (4) 
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where the left-hand side has the difference between the output of the working-age individuals 
and their consumption – the surplus output available to the retired older generations – and the 
right-hand side has the consumption and medical expenditures of the retired population.  
The Lagrangian can be written as follows: 
Γ = 𝑅𝑢(𝑐𝑤) + (γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)𝑣(𝑐𝑜, γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅) + 𝜆[𝑅(𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤) − (γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏)]    (5) 
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption while young, 𝑐𝑤, consumption while 
old, 𝑐𝑜, and medical expenditures τ follow. We start with the first-order condition with 
respect to consumption of the working age individuals, 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑐𝑤
= 𝑅𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) − 𝜆𝑅 = 0 
or 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) = 𝜆                                                           (6) 
which sets the marginal utility of consumption equal to the shadow price of wealth. The first-
order condition for the consumption of the old is similar except that marginal utility depends 
on the number of retirees 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑐𝑜
= (γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)𝑣1(𝑐𝑜, γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅) − 𝜆(γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅) = 0 
or 
𝑣1(𝑐𝑜,𝐴 − 𝑅) = 𝜆                                                           (7) 
Combining the (6) and (7) gives, 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) = 𝑣1(𝑐𝑜 ,𝐴 − 𝑅)                                                    (8) 
It follows that the more people are alive after retirement age, the higher is the level of 
consumption of each retired individual due to v12 > 0 and the lower is the level of 
consumption of each working-age individual. 
7 
 
We now come to the first-order condition with respect to spending on health care τ: 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝜏
= 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)[𝑣(𝑐𝑜, γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅) + (γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)𝑣2(𝑐𝑜 , γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)] − 𝜆𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏)
− 𝜆(γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅) = 0 
Or using (6): 
𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)[𝑣(𝑐𝑜 ,𝐴 − 𝑅) + (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣2(𝑐𝑜 ,𝐴 − 𝑅)] = 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)[𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + (𝐴 − 𝑅)]    (9) 
The left-hand side has the marginal benefit of spending more on health care. The first term on 
the left is the utility of those who survive due to the extra expenditures and would have died 
without them. Secondly, we have the increased utility of those who would have lived in the 
absence of the increased expenditures but now have more old people to socialize with. The 
right-hand side then has the marginal cost. The increased costs stem from the utility loss of 
the working-age population due to the consumption and medical care of the individuals 
whose lives are extended and also the higher medical costs of the old individuals who would 
have survived in the absence of increased medical care.  
The difference between the social and the private optimum lies in the second term on the 
left-hand side and the first term on the right-hand side. The first term on the right-hand side is 
ignored by the private individual who is deciding on his own level of old-age health care 
because he can rely on the rest of society – annuities in Gestsson and Zoega (2018) – to 
sacrifice consumption in order to provide him with consumption and health care for the 
extension of his life. This omission will make him spend more on health care and live longer 
than the social planner would dictate. But there is also a term on the left-hand side of the 
equation that he ignores, which is the positive external effect he has on the utility of other old 
individuals who can now enjoy his company. This will make him underinvest in life-
extending health care compared to the social planner. It follows that the private optimum is 
where 
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𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)𝑣(𝑐𝑜 ,𝐴 − 𝑅) = 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)(𝐴 − 𝑅)                                     (10) 
There will only be an overinvestment in health care if 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) > 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣2(𝑐𝑜,𝐴 − 𝑅)                  (11) 
that is the marginal cost omitted by the private individual exceeds the omitted marginal 
benefit.  
Finally, there is the first-order condition with respect to the Lagrange multiplier: 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝜕
= 𝑅(𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤) − (γ𝐵(𝜏) − 𝑅)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) = 0                              (12) 
For the first-order conditions to represent a maximum the bordered it is sufficient that the 
Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite. See Appendix I.  
 
3.  An overlapping-generations model 
We now formulate our insight in a more rigorous model that has overlapping generations in 
continuous time. We use the model, based on Andersen and Gestsson (2016) and Gestsson 
and Zoega (2018), to both solve the social planner’s problem as well as the private 
individual’s life-time utility maximisation. 
 
Demographics 
The population at time t is split into two groups: those working (young), whose ages are 
between 0 and R (𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]), and those retired (old), whose ages are between R and A 
(𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]), where R is the retirement age and A is the maximum age or longevity. Because 
the main concern of this paper are the effects of health care expenditure for the elderly, it is 
assumed that survival probabilities are constant and equal to one when an individual is 
young, and decreasing and concave in age when he is old. Hence the survival probabilities 
are: 
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𝑚(𝑎,𝐴) = � 1𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)  𝑖𝑓 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                                (13) 
where lim𝑎→𝑅+ 𝑓(𝑎,𝐴) = 1 and 𝑓(𝐴,𝐴) = 0, which implies that 0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑎,𝐴) < 1 must hold 
for all 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]. Further, it is assumed that 𝑓(𝑎,𝐴) is strictly decreasing and strictly 
concave in a and strictly increasing in A: 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑎
< 0,𝜕2𝑓
𝜕𝑎2
< 0, 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐴
> 0                                                         
The following figure shows the survival function: 
 
Note that although longevity is uncertain for a given individual the fraction of individuals 
reaching a certain age is deterministic for the social planner.  
Following Boucekkine et al. (2002), the number of individuals born is assumed to grow at 
a constant rate n, which affects the age distribution in steady state. The number of individuals 
born at time t is 𝜑𝑒𝑛𝑛, where 𝜑 > 0. The number of individuals aged a at time t is therefore: 
𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴) = 𝜑𝑒𝑛(𝑛−𝑎)𝑚(𝑎,𝐴) > 0                                                 (14) 
Note that 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎, 0,𝐴) = 𝜑𝑒𝑛𝑛 > 0, 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝐴,𝐴) = 0 and 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑎
< 0; the number of individuals 
born at time t is 𝜑𝑒𝑛𝑛, the number of individuals exceeding the maximum age A is zero, and 
the number of individuals aged a is strictly decreasing in a for all 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴], t and A. In 
 m(a,A) 
R A 
1 
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addition, 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
> 0 for all 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴], implying that the number of old individuals at each age 
level 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴] is increasing in longevity. Using (14), the population mass in the economy at 
time t can be written as 
𝑁(𝑡,𝑎,𝐴) = � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎 + � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎                     (15)  𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
𝑅
𝑎=0
 
and the number of young and old individuals, respectively: 
𝑁𝑤(𝑡,𝑎,𝑅,𝐴) = � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎, 𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎 = 𝜑𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎   (1 − 𝑒−𝑛𝑅)                        𝑅
𝑎=0
(16)  
where the second uses (13) and (14), and 
𝑁𝑜(𝑡,𝑎,𝑅,𝐴) = � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎, 𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                                          (17) 
It follows from (14)-(17) that the population growth rate and the rate of growth of young and 
old individuals in the economy follow the growth rate of individuals born: ?̇? 𝑁⁄ = 𝑎 and 
?̇?𝑤 𝑁𝑤⁄ = ?̇?𝑜 𝑁𝑜⁄ = 𝑎 where 𝑁,̇  ?̇?𝑤 and ?̇?𝑜 are the time derivatives, while the dependency 
ratio, i.e. the ratio between the number of old and young 𝑁𝑜 𝑁𝑤⁄ , is constant over time. 
 
Individual utility 
Now denote consumption during working age by 𝑐𝑤 and consumption during retirement by 
𝑐𝑜. We assume that utility when young is 
𝑢�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)� 𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                                     (18) 
where 𝑢′ > 0 and 𝑢′′ < 0, while utility when old depends on the number of people alive 
𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜) 𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                          (19) 
where v1>0, v11<0, v2>0, v22<0 and v12>0.  
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Health care expenditure and longevity 
Health care expenditure per old individual 𝜏 is assumed to affect longevity and thus the health 
of old individuals (since 𝑓(𝑎,𝐴) is assumed to be strictly increasing in A) in the following 
way: 
𝐴 = 𝛾𝐵(𝜏)                                                                 (20)                                                               
where 𝛾 > 0 is a parameter measuring efficiency in health care production, and 𝐵′ > 0 and 
𝐵′′ < 0 implying positive but diminishing returns to health care expenditure. Furthermore , it 
is assumed that 𝛾𝐵(0) > 𝑅 ensuring A>R for all 𝜏 ≥ 0 implying that all individuals reach 
retirement age even though there is no spending on old-age health care.  
 
Output 
Each young individual produces 𝑦 > 0 at each point in time. National output in the economy 
at time t can therefore be written as:  
𝑁𝑤(𝑡,𝑎,𝑅,𝐴)𝑦                                                           (21)                                                    
It follows that national output can only increase when the number of working-age individuals 
increases or if output per working individual goes up. 
This and constant dependency ratio (𝑁𝑜
𝑁𝑤
) (see above) ensures stationarity in the model and 
the existence of steady state solutions for the optimal consumption per capita and health 
expenditure per old individual since it implies that output per capita 𝑁𝑤𝑦
𝑁𝑤+𝑁𝑜
 = 𝑦
1+
𝑁𝑜
𝑁𝑤
 is constant 
over time. 
The social planner’s problem 
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We assume a balanced current account growth path in steady state and hence balanced budget 
constraints for the economy at each point in time. The economy-wide budget constraint is 
therefore in balance at all points in time: 
� 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
= � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                             
which can, after multiplying through by 𝑒−𝑛𝑛, be written as: 
� 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
= � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                    (22)      
 where 𝑙(𝑎,𝑎,𝐴) = 𝑒−𝑛𝑛𝑙(𝑡,𝑎, 𝑎,𝐴). 
Because a balanced budget for the economy is assumed, there is no transfer of resources 
across time in steady state. The social planner’s welfare objective can therefore be written as 
𝑊 = � 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)𝑢�𝑐(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 +𝑅
𝑎=0
� 𝑙(𝑡,𝑎, 𝑎,𝐴)𝑣(𝑐𝑓(𝑎),𝑁𝑓)𝑎𝑎                     𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
 
which can, after multiplying through by 𝑒−𝑛𝑛, be written as 
𝑊� = � 𝑙(𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)𝑢�𝑐(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 +𝑅
𝑎=0
� 𝑙(𝑎,𝑎,𝐴)𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎                 (23)𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
 
where 𝑊� = 𝑒−𝑛𝑛𝑊.  
In essence, the social planner is maximizing the sum of utilities of all living generations at 
a point in time, and thus gives a golden rule, taking into account that his decision affects both 
consumption of each working individual through taxes as well as the number of old 
individuals who get to live due to the provision of health care. He can choose to increase the 
number of the living by reducing the consumption of each member of the working-age 
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population and finds the optimal amount of expenditures on health care, hence also the 
optimal tax rate, by trading off one effect against the other.  
The maximization problem solved by the social planner is equivalent to maximizing the 
expected lifetime utility of a given individual over his life in that by always maximizing the 
sum of utilities of all living individuals of different ages he manages to maximize the 
expected lifetime utility of each individual. 
The maximization of this objective function subject to the budget constraint in (22) gives 
the social optimum. Note that the welfare function in (23) is strictly increasing in 
𝑐𝑤(𝑎) for all 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅], 𝑐𝑜(𝑎) for all 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴] and τ (through A). The budget constraint in 
(22) ensures that a maximum exists to the constrained maximization problem (increased 
spending on health care per old individual decreases consumption given output and hence 
raises the marginal utility of consumption, ensuring that a maximum exists). Also note that 
time t does not appear in (22) or (23) and, hence, the solutions for consumption per capita and 
spending on health care per old individual are independent of time. 
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is (after using (13), (14), (16), (17), (20), 
(22) and (23)): 
𝛤 = � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑢�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
+ � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓�𝑎, 𝛾𝐵(𝜏)�𝑣 �𝑐𝑓(𝑎),𝑁𝑜�𝑡,𝑎,𝑅, 𝛾𝐵(𝜏)�� 𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾(𝜏)
𝑎=𝑅
 
+𝜆 � � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
− � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓�𝑎, 𝛾𝐵(𝜏)�(𝑐𝑓(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾(𝜏)
𝑎=𝑅
� 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are derived using that 𝑓(𝐴,𝐴) = 0:  
𝑢′�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)� = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓    𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                                (24) 
𝑣1(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜) = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                            (25) 
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� � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐴
𝑣(𝑐𝑓(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
�𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)
+ � � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑣2(𝑐𝑓(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝜕𝑁𝑜𝜕𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
� 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) 
=λ � � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐴
(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
� 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) +λ � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
 (25) 
The last condition is the budget constraint for the economy that sets total output net of 
consumption when young equal to the sum of consumption of the old and the provision of 
health care for the old: 
� 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
= � 𝜑𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)(𝑐𝑓(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
             (26) 
The conditions in (24) and (25) imply that consumption when young and old are constant, 
although not necessarily equal: 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓    𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                           (27) 
𝑣1(𝑐𝑜,𝑁𝑜) = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                       (28) 
Using (27) and (28) in (25) after multiplying through by 𝑒𝑛𝑛, and using (13) – (17), gives our 
main result: 
𝑣(𝑐𝑜 ,𝑁𝑓) 𝜕𝑁0𝜕𝐴 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) + 𝑣2(𝑐𝑜 ,𝑁𝑓)𝑁𝑓 𝜕𝑁𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) 
                                   = 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)(𝑐𝑓 + 𝜏) 𝜕𝑁𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) + 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)𝑁𝑓                                  (29)                                        
The equation gives optimal spending on health care per old individual, which is our golden 
rule of health care spending. The left-hand side shows increased social welfare in terms of a 
greater number of old individuals reaching each age level and also more individuals receiving 
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utility from consumption in each other’s companionship. The first term on the right-hand side 
shows the lost utility for all others, whose consumption is reduced due to the consumption 
and medical needs of those who now reach higher age levels because of the increased 
provision of health care. The second term denotes the marginal cost of increased health care 
for those individuals over retirement age who would have survived in the absence of the 
increased spending on medical care.  
 
Individual decision making 
Due to the uncertain lifetime of an individual, it is assumed that there exists an annuities 
market (as in Yaari, 1965) providing an individual with an instrument to insure himself 
against an uncertain lifetime (see, for example, Blanchard (1985) and Sheshinski (2008)). 
This implies that an individual buys annuities at any age a from an insurance company 
earning rate of return ( )arb  and the insurance company invests at an exogenous rate of return 
r for the amount of annuities bought. A zero-profit condition for the insurance company – due 
to the assumption of free entry into the competitive annuity market – gives the following in 
equilibrium;  
𝑓𝑏(𝑎) = 𝑓 + 𝜌(𝑎,𝐴)                                                         (30)                                                    
where 𝜌(𝑎,𝐴) = − 𝜕𝜕(𝑎,𝐴)𝜕𝑎
𝑚(𝑎,𝜕)  is the hazard rate for an individual aged a, i.e. the probability that 
an individual dies at age a conditional on being alive at age a. It follows that the higher the 
mortality rate the higher is rb. Hence, using equation (13) gives 
       𝜌(𝑎,𝐴) = � 0−𝜕𝜕(𝑎,𝐴)𝜕𝑎
𝑓(𝑎,𝜕)     𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅](𝑅,𝐴]                                           (31)                                   
and, hence, in equilibrium: 
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𝑓𝑏(𝑎) = � 𝑓𝑓 + 𝜌(𝑎,𝐴)  𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅](𝑅,𝐴]                                    (32)  
The preceding equations show that the higher the mortality rate among retirees, the higher are 
the earnings on the annuity in equilibrium.  
An individual’s expected lifetime utility is 
𝑈 = � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑚(𝑎,𝐴)𝑢�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
+ � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑚(𝑎,𝐴)𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                       
where δ > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Using (13), the equation can be written 
as 
𝑈 = � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑢�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
+ � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                   (33) 
An individual consumes when young and old, works and earns labor income when young and 
spends on old-age health care when old. His budget constraint therefore reads; 
� 𝑒−𝛤(𝑎)𝑅
𝑎=0
�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 = � 𝑒−𝛤(𝑎)𝛾𝛾(𝜏)𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎                          
where  Γ(𝑎) = ∫ 𝑓𝑏(𝑧)𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑧=0 , or (using (32)) 
� 𝑒−𝑟𝑎
𝑅
𝑎=0
�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 = � 𝑒−𝛤(𝑎)𝛾𝛾(𝜏)
𝑎=𝑅
(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎                       (34) 
An individual’s problem is to choose {𝑐𝑤(𝑎)}𝑎=0𝑅 , {𝑐𝑜(𝑎)}𝑎=𝑅𝜕  and τ such that (33) is 
maximized subject to (34) and (20) taking the annuity contract rb and the number of old 
individuals No as given (hence, these are independent of longevity A in an individual’s 
optimization problem). The Lagrangian for the problem is: 
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Γ = � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑢�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 + � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑓�𝑎, 𝛾𝐵(𝜏)�𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎                                 𝛾𝛾(𝜏)
𝑎=𝑅
𝑅
𝑎=0
 
+𝜆 � � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑅
𝑎=0
�𝑦 − 𝑐𝑤(𝑎)�𝑎𝑎 − � 𝑒−𝛤(𝑎)𝛾𝛾(𝜏)
𝑎=𝑅
(𝑐𝑜(𝑎) + 𝜏)𝑎𝑎�                                        
Assuming an interior solution, this gives the following first-order conditions (in addition to 
the budget constraint in (34)), where it is used that 𝑓(𝐴,𝐴) = 0: 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑐𝑤(𝑎) = 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑢′�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)� − 𝜆𝑒−𝑟𝑎 = 0    𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                            (35) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝑐𝑜(𝑎) = 𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑣1(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜) − 𝜆𝑒−𝛤(𝑎) = 0     𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                  (36) 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝜏
= � � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝑎=𝑅 � 𝛾𝐵´(𝜏)                                                                             
−𝜆𝑒−Γ(𝜕)(𝑐(𝐴) + 𝜏)𝛾𝐵´(𝜏) − 𝜆 � 𝑒−Γ(𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
= 0                       (37) 
Using that in equilibrium (using (30) - (32)): 
𝑒−Γ(𝑎) = 𝑒−∫ [𝑟+𝜌(𝑧,𝜕)]𝑑𝑧𝑎𝑧=0 = 𝑒−∫ �𝑟+−𝛿𝑓(𝑧,𝜕)𝛿𝑧𝑓(𝑧,𝜕) �𝑎𝑧=0 𝑑𝑧 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑎+∫ �𝛿𝑓(𝑧,𝜕)𝛿𝑧𝑓(𝑧,𝜕) �𝑎𝑧=0 𝑑𝑧
= 𝑒−𝑟𝑎+∫ �𝑑𝜕𝑛𝑓(𝑎,𝜕)𝑑𝑧 �𝑎𝑧=0 𝑑𝑧 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑎+∫ 𝑑𝜕𝑛𝑓(𝑧,𝜕)𝑎𝑧=0  
= 𝑒−𝑟𝑎+[𝜕𝑛𝑓(𝑎,𝜕)−𝜕𝑛𝑓(0,𝜕)] = 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑒𝜕𝑛𝑓(𝑎,𝜕) = 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)             
where it is used that 𝑓(0,𝐴) = 1, gives the conditions in (35)-(37) as: 
𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑢′�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)� = 𝜆𝑒−𝑟𝑎    𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                               
𝑒−𝛿𝑎𝑣1(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜) = 𝜆𝑒−𝑟𝑎    𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                           
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� � 𝑒−𝛿𝑎
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐴
𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝑎=𝑅 � 𝛾𝐵´(𝜏) = 𝜆 � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎
𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
                   
where it has been used that 𝑓(𝐴,𝐴) = 0. Since we are only interested in comparing allocation 
under individual decision making with the steady state social planner allocation, we ignore 
the possibility of a time-varying consumption profile for an individual being optimal and 
assume that that the real interest rate r equals the subjective rate of time preference δ and, 
hence; 
𝑢′�𝑐𝑤(𝑎)� = 𝜆    𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                        (38) 
𝑣1(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜) = 𝜆    𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                       (39) 
� � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐴
𝑣(𝑐𝑜(𝑎),𝑁𝑜)𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝑎=𝑅 �𝛾𝐵´(𝜏) = 𝜆 � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎
𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
              (40) 
The conditions in (38) and (39) imply that consumption when young and old are constant, 
although not necessarily equal: 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓    𝑎 ∈ [0,𝑅]                                                
𝑣1(𝑐𝑜,𝑁𝑜) = 𝜆   𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎 ∈ (𝑅,𝐴]                                               
Using this in (40) gives: 
𝑣(𝑐𝑜,𝑁𝑜)� � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐴𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝑎=𝑅 �𝛾𝐵´(𝜏) = 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) � 𝑒−𝑟𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎
𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
             (41)    
 
The left-hand side of the equation shows the marginal benefit of increased spending on old-
age health care, which is the increased utility due to longer life expectancy, while the right-
hand side has the marginal cost in the form of lower utility during working years.  
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Social optimum and individual decision making compared 
Equation (41) can be compared to equation (42) below that gives the optimal (that is the 
social planner) level of spending on the health care. Using equations (13), (14), (15) and (17) 
in (29), multiplying through with 𝑒−𝑛𝑛 and dividing by the parameter φ gives that spending 
on old-age health care in social optimum has to fulfil:                               
𝑣(𝑐𝑜 ,𝑁𝑓)� � 𝑒−𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝐴
𝑎=𝑅 � 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)
+ 𝑣2(𝑐𝑜 ,𝑁𝑓)� � 𝑒−𝑎𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴) 𝜕𝑁𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝐴
𝑎=𝑅 � 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) 
= 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) � � 𝑒−𝑛𝑎 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
� 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏) + 𝑢′(𝑐𝑤) � 𝑒−𝑛𝑎𝑓(𝑎,𝐴)𝑎𝑎𝜕
𝑎=𝑅
 
(42) 
Assuming that r=n, the two equations in (41) and (42) differ since the second term on the left 
hand side and the first term on the right hand side of (42) are missing from equation (41). The 
former captures the external effect of one person’s longevity on the utility of other old 
individuals while the latter captures the cost of consumption and health care of his increased 
longevity born by other working-age individuals. While the latter would make the individual 
spend more than the social optimum on life-extending health care, the latter would make him 
spend less. It is this effect which is novel in our derivation. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The literature on the optimal level of life-extending health care compares the marginal cost of 
increased spending on health care, taking the form of lower consumption of working-age 
individuals, to the marginal benefit in the form of increased longevity that brings extra 
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consumption and utility. The main difference between the social and the private optimum is 
that an individual would ignore the negative pecuniary cost of his increased longevity on 
others, hence overinvest in life-extending healthcare.  We add to this literature the effect of 
increased longevity of one individual on the utility of others who would have missed her 
company and hence not enjoyed their consumption to the same extent. The basic idea is that 
the utility from consumption depends on others sharing the experience.   
 
Appendix I 
 
The matrix of second derivatives of the Lagrangian function is (after inserting the FOC and 
using that γB(τ)=A); 
𝐻 = � 0                                     −𝑅−𝑅                              𝑅𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤) −(𝐴 − 𝑅) 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + (𝐴 − 𝑅)0 0−(𝐴 − 𝑅)                            0
𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + (𝐴 − 𝑅) 0 (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣11 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣12𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣12 𝐾 �               
where 
𝐾 ≡ 𝛾𝐵′′(𝜏)𝑣 − 𝛾[𝐵′′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + 2𝐵′(𝜏)]𝑣1 + 𝛾[2𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)2 + (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝐵′′(𝜏)]𝑣2+ (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝛾2𝐵′(𝜏)2𝑣22        
Sufficient conditions for a local maximum are then |𝐻1| = � 0 −𝑅−𝑅 𝑅𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤)� < 0                                                                                                                 
|𝐻2| = � 0  −𝑅 −(𝐴 − 𝑅)−𝑅  𝑅𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤) 0
−(𝐴 − 𝑅) 0 (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣11� > 0                                                                    
|𝐻3| = � 0                                     −𝑅−𝑅                              𝑅𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤) −(𝐴 − 𝑅) 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + (𝐴 − 𝑅)0 0−(𝐴 − 𝑅)                            0
𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝑐𝑜 + 𝜏) + (𝐴 − 𝑅) 0 (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣11 𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣12𝛾𝐵′(𝜏)(𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑣12 𝐾 � < 0 
Here we have |𝐻1| = −𝑅2 < 0                                                             
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|𝐻2| = −𝑅(𝐴 − 𝑅)[𝑅𝑣11 + (𝐴 − 𝑅)𝑢′′(𝑐𝑤)] > 0 
and |𝐻3| < 0 is assumed to hold.  
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